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Abstract 
The total cost of cybercrime has been estimated to exceed US$388 billion annually. The availability of crimeware 
toolkits has lowered the bar for entry to the world of cybercrime. With very little technical knowledge required, 
cybercriminals can create, deploy and harvest financial data using banking trojans though a point and click 
graphical user interface that can cost less than US$1000. Technical support is also available for a fee, including 
technical infrastructure and servers to store harvested data. Fraudsters employing crimeware toolkits have been 
reported to have stolen US$3.2 million dollars in as little as six months. This paper presents preliminary research 
that has been conducted to forensically recover and analyse artefacts from the process of using crimeware 
toolkits from the file system and memory of systems that have been potentially engaged in such banking trojan 
authoring activities. Construction of a banking trojan using a crimeware toolkit follows a process that typically 
requires a set of configuration files and a small suite of program tools within the toolkit. Artefacts can be 
recovered from the process that could potentially be presented for admission as evidence in a court of law. 
Artefacts from the toolkits vary, as does the versions and variants of available toolkits. This paper proposes 
further research to construct a library of baseline artefacts to assist in the reconstruction of events to assist the 
forensic analyst in determining the provenance of any particular banking trojan. 
Keywords 
Digital forensics, crimeware, ZeuS, Spy Eye, Pinch, Carberp, cybercrime, banking trojan, botnet. 
INTRODUCTION 
A recent study estimates the cost of cybercrime worldwide to exceed US$388 billion dollars annually which 
exceeds the postulated US$288 billion cost of the global black market of illicit drugs such as marijuana, cocaine 
and heroin combined. The report also claims that more than two thirds of adults who go online have been a 
victim of cybercrime in their lifetime (Norton, 2011). Trend Micro (2011a, 2011b) reports that the top 10 
cybercrime targets of the crimeware toolkits include online users of PayPal, eBay, Yahoo!, Facebook, Pharmacy 
Express, HSBC Bank, ANZ Bank, Lloyds TSB Bank, Banco Santander Bank and Western Union Bank. 
 Malicious software developers create, market and support crimeware toolkits that can create malicious software 
(malware) which can be used for the theft of financial transaction data such as bank account information, credit 
card data, authentication credentials and personal identities. Such targeted malware is typically referred to as a 
"banking trojan". The command and control infrastructure for the malware is in the form of a botnet which may 
include thousands of infected machines from which financial and personal data can be harvested.  Instances of 
crimeware toolkits such as ZeuS, Spy Eye, Pinch and Carberp employ graphical user interfaces such that the 
cybercriminal  needs very little technical knowledge to create a banking trojan (Trend Micro, 2011a, 2011b). A 
report by Trend Micro (2011c) reveals that an investigation into a certain cybercriminal's activities who 
employed such a toolkit to have stolen over US$3.2 million in six months from a botnet that employed over 
25,000 systems, predominately located in the United States. 
A generic, potential lifecycle for a banking Trojan built by a crimeware toolkit is depicted in Figure 1. The 
diagram shows that the toolkit is purchased from an online cybercrime site or obtained from some other means 
such as transfer from an external drive, email attachment or some other source. The toolkit is then installed on a 
system. The requisite files and tools may be on the single system or distributed across mounted volumes or 
network shares. 
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Figure 1 Potential Crimeware Toolkit Usage Life Cycle 
 
The crimeware toolkits examined for the purpose of this research all contained user's manuals and it is 
understood that online support is also available for a fee. The heart of the toolkit is a graphical user interface 
based "Builder" program that invokes a small number of supporting programs to build the resulting banking 
trojan and this process also requires the editing of a small number of configuration files. Once built, the banking 
trojan is likely to be tested in some manner, even if it is just to ensure that the resultant hash does not register as 
a known hash or virus signature. Once tested, it is envisaged that the trojan is deployed. The banking trojan can 
be deployed via a variety of mechanisms including spammed email that contains a link to a hijacked web site 
that uses iframes running malicious javascript. The malicious javascript can exploit vulnerabilities in the 
browser of the user which can then execute code on the target computer to conduct a variety of nefarious 
activities, including disabling security software and can download additional malware to the victim. Once 
compromised, the infected computer can be updated with enhanced malware at the discretion of the person in 
command of the botnet, typically referred to as the bot herder. The bot herder can then operate the botnet system 
from a distance, through a layered, hierarchical command and control system. Information can then be harvested 
and exploited in some predetermined measure.   
The purpose of this paper is to present preliminary research that could be suitable for investigating a computer 
system suspected of having being used to author a banking trojan using a crimeware toolkit. The intention is to 
present artefacts of the authoring process as evidence suitable for admission to a court of law.  This intention 
assumes that the sources of evidence accessible from the suspect machine have been acquired in a legal and 
forensically sound manner. Only the analysis phase of the investigation is discussed in this paper. This particular 
area of interest is depicted in the life cycle diagram of Figure 1 between reading the user manual to testing the 
resultant trojan and is highlighted in the figure. This paper does not investigate how the toolkit was originally 
acquired, nor does it investigate how the banking trojan was deployed, nor how the botnet was controlled, nor 
how information was harvested or exploited from the deployed banking trojan. These lines of investigation are 
left for future lines of research. The highlighted components in the figure emphasize the processes that are highly 
likely to have been conducted on one system. The components of the diagram that are not highlighted may have 
been conducted on the one system, but need not to have been. 
Understanding the life cycle for any particular crimeware toolkit version or variant could assist an investigation. 
It can lead to the reconstruction of events, which can be represented in a timeline, which can be corroborated and 
supported with the artefacts from following the building process. Discovery of the artefacts from the combined 
acts of editing configuration files, running the builder program (which in turn runs subservient tools which leave 
artefacts) and accessing a user's manual may support the two essential elements required for a case. That is, actus 
reus (latin for guilty act) and mens rea (latin for guilty mind) which may be used to prove that the accused 
committed the prohibited act and possessed the culpable mental state (Shinder, 2002). Additional evidence such 
as the deployment of the trojan, the harvesting and exploitation of the resultant information from the trojan 
would likely provide additional, supporting elements to the case. 
CRIMEWARE 
Crimeware Toolkit Capabilities 
Crimeware toolkits that include ZeuS, Spy Eye, Pinch, Carberp and Bugat, predominately operate under 
Microsoft Windows systems, but may also target alternative platforms such as mobile devices (S21sec, 2010).  
Malware continues to evolve, it is becoming more stealthy, increasingly targeted and incorporating additional 
anti-analysis techniques (Brand, 2010).  As an example, Barrett (2011) lists features of Spy Eye to include a ring 
3 rootkit which means it can hide registry and file entries from a limited privileges account. It can hook the 
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supported web browsers such as Internet Explorer, Firefox and Maxthon, and then inject code into the browser. 
It can intercept and control traffic by hooking into API calls. It can steal HTTP secured connection session data. 
It can inject forms into legitimate web pages of banks by using webinjects. Such forms can include fields to 
entice the victim to enter data such as Personal Identification Numbers (PIN) that are not required not requested 
by the online financial institution. It can include keyloggers to capture legitimate data entered by the victim. It 
can include data mining algorithms to collect and forward only relevant, filtered data to the Command and 
Control server via encrypted data channels. 
Crimeware Toolkit Components 
An examination of crimeware toolkits conducted for the purpose of this research reveals that a number of high 
level components appear to be in common to most of the variants and versions. This commonality includes 
configuration files for customizing the botnet and other files, such as the webinjects file that contains content 
injection rules. There is typically a builder program that generates the malware binary to infect the victims from 
the clear text configuration files that are customised by the cybercriminal. The format of these configuration files 
vary between the variants of crimeware toolkits, but all of the toolkits examined used configuration files. An 
encrypted version of the configuration file is created using an encryption key. It is a separate file to the 
executable and is generally downloaded during execution of the binary. The behaviour of the binary on the target 
system can then be modified at the direction of the cybercriminal. A small number of standalone programs are 
also included in the toolkits, including file archivers, build tools, packers, protectors, assemblers and a PHP 
compiler for compiling PHP web scripts. Other tools for deploying the malware may also be found as well as 
supporting documentation such as manuals to assist in the authoring process. 
The very nature of the development and release process is tailored to ensure that it works for the cybercriminal 
who is using the crimeware toolkit to create the banking trojan with minimal effort and complications. This 
means that there is a definitive structure to the configuration files for the build process and that various artefacts 
of the development and release process can be recovered to reconstruct the event of having built the resultant 
banking trojan. Various plug-ins, enhancements and customisations are available and can be purchased and 
traded on underground forums (Hypponen, 2011), but it could be expected that the core framework, and 
development and release process, for any of the particular versions or variants of the crimeware toolkits will 
remain consistent in the short term. This is essentially because a level of customisation is essential for customers 
to tailor the trojan for their particular needs. This necessitates an editable configuration file. This in turn means 
the configuration file requires structure with defined fields, so that the builder program can parse and interpret it 
to create a trojan that will function correctly. It would be very difficult to consider an alternate method that 
combines ease of use, consistency and reliability. In addition, reuse of tried, true and tested code is a 
fundamental principal of best practice software engineering. 
FORENSIC ANALYSIS 
Crimeware Toolkit Artefacts 
Detection of the tools in the toolkit may not be reliably detected by an antivirus (AV) software suite. This is 
because AV software that is signature based is reliant upon previous detection and extraction of an appropriate 
signature.  The tool can be protected and/or packed which will obfuscate the code, change the hash and change 
the signature of the code. A variety of techniques can be implemented to further hinder the digital forensic 
analyst. This can include techniques such as anti emulation, anti online analysis, anti hardware, anti debugger, 
anti disassembler, anti tools, anti memory, anti process and rootkits as discussed by Brand, Valli and Woodward 
(2010). In addition, it is quite simple to change the hash of any program to be the hash of a program that is on a 
known good file list to avoid being relegated to a list of unknown files for investigation (Foster, Liu, 2005). 
The configuration files between the toolkits can be different, but they do appear very similar within variants and 
versions of the same toolkit with clearly defined key fields and parameters. Although these files may be deleted, 
the potential exists to recover full or remnant parts of the files from memory devices, allocated or unallocated 
space, the hibernation files, the memory page files and from physical memory dumps. The configuration files are 
typically textual in nature, and lend themselves to key word searches. The tailoring of the banking trojan itself is 
determined by the configuration files. Hence to determine the released trojans capability, recovery of the 
configuration file could provide supporting evidence of the activity of having built a particular banking trojan. In 
addition, it could be possible to associate a particular banking trojan with a particular configuration file.  Figure 
4 demonstrates the structure of the ZeuS 1.2.4.2 configuration file. Clearly defined fields and delimiters are 
present. Figure 5 presents a small section of the WebInjects file. The WebInjects clearly lists URLs of common 
and popular banking websites. Figure 6 shows a small subsection of the user manual that uses terms associated 
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with the particular crimeware kit version. The manual needs to be descriptive enough for users to tailor their 
developed malware. In all cases of the selection of crimeware toolkits examined, keywords and structure are 
evident and could be very useful for keyword searches, file carving, indexing and filtering.  
 
;Build time:   14:15:23 10.04.2009 GMT 
;Version:      1.2.4.2 
 
entry "StaticConfig" 
  ;botnet "btn1" 
  timer_config 60 1 
  timer_logs 1 1 
  timer_stats 20 1 
  url_config "http://localhost/config.bin" 
  url_compip "http://localhost/ip.php" 1024 
  encryption_key "secret key" 
  ;blacklist_languages 1049 
end 
 
entry "DynamicConfig" 
  url_loader "http://localhost/bot.exe" 
  url_server "http://localhost/gate.php" 
  file_webinjects "webinjects.txt" 
  entry "AdvancedConfigs" 
    ;"http://advdomain/cfg1.bin" 
  end 
  entry "WebFilters" 
    "!*.microsoft.com/*" 
    "!http://*myspace.com*" 
    "https://www.gruposantander.es/*" 
    "!http://*odnoklassniki.ru/*" 
    "!http://vkontakte.ru/*" 
    "@*/login.osmp.ru/*" 
    "@*/atl.osmp.ru/*" 
  end 
  entry "WebDataFilters" 
    ;"http://mail.rambler.ru/*" "passw;login" 
  end 
  entry "WebFakes" 
    ;"http://www.google.com" "http://www.yahoo.com" "GP" "" "" 
  end 
  entry "TANGrabber" 
    "https://banking.*.de/cgi/ueberweisung.cgi/*" "S3R1C6G" "*&tid=*" "*&betrag=*" 
    "https://internetbanking.gad.de/banking/*" "S3C6" "*" "*" "KktNrTanEnz" 
    "https://www.citibank.de/*/jba/mp#/SubmitRecap.do" "S3C6R2" "SYNC_TOKEN=*" "*" 
  end 
  entry "DnsMap" 
    ;127.0.0.1 microsoft.com 
  end 
end 
Figure 4 ZeuS 1.2.4.2 configuration file highlighting keywords 
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set_url https://banking*.anz.com/* GPL 
data_before 
<td class="actionHeaderTopPadding" >Balances and Transactions 
data_end 
data_inject 
data_end 
data_after 
<!--This is required for bway:button 
data_end 
 
set_url https://olb2.nationet.com/signon/signon* GPL 
data_before 
Passnumber:</SPAN> 
data_end 
data_inject 
data_end 
data_after 
<TD COLSPAN="4" CLASS="consolebackground"> 
data_end 
set_url https://www.nwolb.com/Login.asp* GPL 
data_before 
<span OnClick="window.open('https://www.nwolb.com/help.asp 
data_end 
data_inject 
data_end 
data_after 
<script language="javascript">document.write("<img src='brands/NWB/ 
data_end 
Figure 5 small extraction of  a ZeuS 1.2.4.2 WebInjects file highlighting keywords 
 
User's Guide (Draft)  
***********************************  
 
==============  
= Contents =  
==============  
 
1. Description and features.  
2. Setting up the server.  
   2.1. HTTP-server.  
   2.2. The interpreter PHP.  
   2.3. MySQL-server.  
   2.4. Control Panel.  
     2.4.1. Installation.  
     2.4.2. Update.  
     2.4.3. File / system / fsarc.php.  
3. Setting Bot.  
4. Working with BackConnect.  
5. Changelog.  
6. F.A.Q.  
7. Myths. 
Figure 6 Small extraction of the ZeuS 1.2.4.2 manual 
 
Various artefacts from memory dumps may be extracted, such as the key entered via the keyboard for encrypting 
the configuration file, text entered via the keyboard, configuration files loaded into memory by the tools, and 
remnants of supporting tools loaded into memory. 
Web browsers act as an interface to internet activities associated with the tailoring and deployment of malware, 
including the reading of user's manuals and potentially online support via various mechanisms. The browser and 
other internet artefacts may be extracted to assist in the reconstruction of events. This may include artefacts from 
chat programs, file sharing programs, web based mail clients, web browsing history, downloads, cookies, cache, 
form history, favourites and profiles. Web history can include redirects, visit from, visit from a bookmark, visit 
from a typed URL, form visits, hidden visits and thumb nailed pages. Download history could include plain text, 
images, media, PDFs, manual downloads, files downloaded to non-standard locations. 
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PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE 
Computer evidence needs to be admissible, authentic, complete, reliable and believable (The Internet Society, 
2002). This paper has considered the acquisition phase of the investigation to be out of scope, however the 
resulting output of the analysis phase will become the input to the presentation phase and hence the analysis phase 
must be conducted with the requirements of admissibility in mind. Given that a set sequence of events, using 
various tools and configuration files must be employed to produce the banking trojan, and will produce artefacts 
in a variety of locations and formats, the author proposes that presentation of evidence would be enhanced by 
presenting the evidence in a timeline that maps to the sequence of events required to build the trojan. Such an 
approach may provide focus in recovering evidence in the analysis phase of the investigation and could be used in 
future investigations to assist in the analysis phase. This approach may also assist to show actus reus and mens 
rea.  A generic template for this activity is provided in Figure 7. Evidence associated with each event in the build 
process can be determined and documented in a timeline format.  
Read Manual /
Obtain
Support
Execute
Builder
Edit
Configuration
File(s)
Build Banking
Trojan Test
Artefacts
File System
Unallocated Space
Memory
Registry
System Logs
Application Logs
Location Location Location Location Location
 
Figure 7 Timeline and Evidence Location Correlation 
CONCLUSION 
The population of the world is increasingly coming online, transferring traditional models of conducting business 
to the internet, necessitating the transfer and storage of personally identifiable information and financial data. This 
provides cybercriminals with the motivation to transfer traditional models of conducting fraud to the internet to 
take advantage of such transactions. Crimeware toolkits, through a simple graphical user interface to produce a 
banking trojan,  provide an opportunity to harvest financial credentials such that funds can be withdrawn from the 
accounts of their victims. This research has shown that although there are many versions and variants of 
crimeware toolkits available, the underlying process of building the trojan using various tools and configuration 
files follows a generic process that leaves artefacts in various locations. To this end, future work will lead to 
developing sequence diagrams for building the versions and variants of known trojans using the required tools 
and configuration files that map to the sequence of events associated with the building process. It is intended that 
a database of information be constructed using this research that can assist the forensic investigator in the analysis 
phase of an investigation that hypothesises that a crimeware tool kit has been employed to author a banking trojan 
on a computer system. 
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